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Abstract  
As the processes of globalization intensify, the issues of people migration and 
citizenship receive more scholarly attention than ever. The questions regarding dual 
or even multiple citizenship are unavoidable nowadays and governments have to 
decide whether they tolerate the fact that their citizens may also be citizens of another 
state or do they prevent their citizens from acquiring multiple citizenships. There are 
various understandings of dual citizenship and the common belief is that more states 
tolerate dual citizenship than ever.  
This master thesis concentrates on the dual citizenship politics in Lithuania. 
While it seems that at least in Europe the governments tend to allow or tolerate dual 
citizenship, the dual citizenship regulation in Lithuania is strict and dual citizenship is 
not tolerated despite the large extent of emigration and emigrants wishes to have the 
right to dual citizenship. The public debate on the dual citizenship in Lithuania is 
intense for about a decade now and politicians have been urged to solve this issue 
many times. However, all the intended changes were stopped by the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania, leaving no way to solve this unless the 
Constitution of Lithuania is changed.  
The politics of dual citizenship in Lithuania in the thesis are analyzed using 
theoretical framework of the nation-building and the geopolitical thinking in the post-
soviet states. First of all, the reasons for the strict regulation of the dual citizenship in 
The Constitution of Lithuania written in 1992 are analyzed. Second of all, the 
resistance to the dual citizenship is analyzed in the context of current emigration from 
Lithuania. The main data was gathered by interviewing experts of the citizenship 
politics in Lithuania. It is revealed that the political resistance to dual citizenship in 
Lithuania is the result of the geopolitical insecurity, national minorities residing in 
Lithuania as well as of Lithuania’s historiography. 
Keywords: Lithuania, citizenship, dual citizenship, nation-building, geopolitics, 
national minority, ethnicity, post-soviet, historiography 
Words: 19 576 
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1. Introduction 
 
As the world becomes more globalized, the academic interest in the citizenhip 
and migration grows prominently. The migration intensifies, so do and the issues of 
the citizenship of those who migrate. The number of people who settle outside the 
states whose citizenship they hold is increasing and this naturally raises the question 
of dual or even multiple citizenship. Should it become a norm because of the 
processes of globalization or should governments restrict dual citizenship because of 
unknown political and social consequences for the nation-states?  
The dominating theories in the citizenship literature are those which argue that 
the tolerance towards dual citizenship and the number of states which allow their 
citizens to be another state’s citizens as well is increasing. This assumption is based 
on the growing importance of human rights paradigm and the higher than ever 
migration extent. It is often argued that the dual or multiple citizenships is a logical 
consequence of the globalization and therefore it should be tolerated. These 
arguments are often found in the academic literature in so-called “immigration” states 
that experience a very high immigration from the Global South states. However, the 
debate about the dual citizenship is still quite different in the Eastern Europe, 
especially in the Baltic States. If the dual citizenship is tolerated, the arguments for 
that are somehow different than in the Western states.  
In the case of Lithuania, dual citizenship is restricted and not tolerated except 
certain requirements are fulfilled but that makes a number of people who are allowed 
to have dual citizenship very small. The resistance and opposition to the dual 
citizenship in Lithuania are analyzed in this thesis. First of all, the restrictions that lay 
within the Constitution of Lithuania are analyzed using the theoretical framework of 
the nation-state building in the post-soviet states. Second of all, it is analyzed why 
where are no changes in the regulation of the dual citizenship now. 
 
5 
 
1.2.   Research problem and questions 
 
While there are some studies done on the citizenship politics in Lithuania, there 
are very few or even no studies done regarding politics of dual citizenship. The 
circumstances in which the citizenship politics are situated in Lithuania have changed 
dramatically after entering the EU in 2004. A large scale emigration has started and 
continues until this day. Lithuanian emigrants went mostly to the member states of 
the EU and settled there and consequently, the issues of the dual citizenship rights 
have emerged. Many emigrants began to talk about this issue in the media and on the 
internet and demand the right to dual citizenship. However, the political resistance 
against dual citizenship is still high and it is usually argued by the officials that the 
whole restriction lies in the Constitution of Lithuania which was introduced in 1992 
and therefore, the only way to change the regulation of dual citizenship is to change 
the Constitution. 
Because of the Law on Citizenship in Lithuania and restrictions that lay within it 
and in the Constitution of Lithuania more Lithuania’s citizens have renounced their 
Lithuanian citizenship than ever. The intensive debates in the media, emigrants’ 
forums and public sphere have been around for around a decade now and yet no 
political change regarding regulations of dual citizenship has happened.  
The research problem is as follows: even though the demand for the dual 
citizenship is high because of the emigration extent and the debate about the dual 
citizenship dominates the public sphere and media for some time now, there are no 
political changes in regulation of the dual citizenship and it remains strictly restricted. 
The main research question is:   
 How the political resistance and opposition to dual citizenship in 
Lithuania can be analyzed and explained?   
The other questions which constitute a great part of the main research question 
are:  
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 How the concept of the citizenship is understood in Lithuania and is it 
related to the resistance to the dual citizenship?  
 Why the restriction of the dual citizenship is expressed in the Constitution 
of Lithuania and how this restriction is related to the political 
circumstances in 1992 when the Constitution was written?        
The initial propositions are: 
 The resistance to dual citizenship in Lithuania is related to the geopolitical 
context Lithuania is situated in; 
 The resistance to dual citizenship in Lithuania is related to the fact that 
Russian minority resides in Lithuania; 
2. Literature and theory review of dual – citizenship 
 
The theory and literature review of this master thesis is organized like this: first 
of all, the ongoing theoretical discussion about the concept of dual citizenship and its 
origins is presented. Second of all, the research on dual citizenship and its results are 
discussed. Finally, the theoretical and empirical studies carried out of the citizenship 
and dual citizenship politics in the Baltic States and Lithuania in particular are 
presented. 
In order to discuss theories of dual citizenship the definitions of citizenship and 
dual – citizenship have to be presented. The definitions of citizenship and dual 
citizenship as some authors suggest are as follow: 
 Citizenship is a source of rights and duties of individuals in the nation-
state mode of political community and is delimitated by national 
collectivity (Soysal, 2000 , p. 5);  
 Dual – citizenship means that individuals combine citizenship of two 
nation – state (Faist et al., 2004, p. 4).  
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The definitions of citizenship and dual citizenship can be disputed. The first 
definition of citizenship includes not only a legal relation between an individual and a 
state but also a moral or symbolic one. Some may argue that the citizenship is only 
the institutionalized relation between the individual and the state, however it is also 
usually agreed that citizenship also has a deeper meaning and value. The theories of 
dual citizenship depend on the definitions and understandings of citizenship and what 
kind of relation it creates between the state and the individual. If citizenship is 
understood as an instrument to achieve certain objectives or as expression of legal 
relation between citizens and the state, when the concept of dual citizenship is less 
complicated. However, if citizenship is considered to be not only a legal connection 
to the state but also a moral obligation or emotional tie, the concept of dual 
citizenship gets more complicated and contested.  
Soysal argues that the contemporary formation of the citizenship is influenced by 
two paradoxes: first, the increasing decoupling of the two main components of 
citizenship - identities and rights, and second, the growing tendency towards 
particularistic and group-based claims and their legitimation through universal 
discourse of the human rights. The concept of the citizenship in the nation-state mode 
is related to the national belonging which creates certain rights and duties of citizens. 
However, recently the citizenship is more often redefined as a human right. The 
duties and rights that were associated with belonging to certain national community 
have now become more and more often associated with transnationalism (Soysal, 
2000 , p. 5).  
Peter J. Spiro argues similarly that the right to have dual citizenship is a human 
right, therefore, in the world in which human rights paradigm is getting stronger dual 
citizenship should be normalized and widely accepted. The right to dual or even 
multiple citizenships is justified “through the optics of freedom of association and 
liberal autonomy values” (Spiro, 2010, p. 111). Spiro claims that the dual citizenship 
was suppressed by the governments because of the historical conditions of ninetieth 
and the beginning of twentieth centuries, mostly because of the interstate conflicts 
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and wars. The dual citizenship was considered to be unacceptable because 
governments at that time needed loyalty from its citizens in the case of the military 
conflicts. However, according to Spiro, military conflicts among liberal states are 
very unlikely nowadays, therefore, there are no obstacles left for legitimization of 
dual citizenship. What is more, as the world witnesses the growth of global 
international community and other processes of globalization, accelerating dual and 
plural citizenships seems as a logical progress and solution to challenges posed by the 
globalization. It is argued that dual citizenship is a part of the individual freedoms 
and an important political right which means it falls under human rights framework. 
Spiro concludes: “It is now possible to frame acquisition and maintenance of the 
status as a right, to the extent that plural citizenship implicates individual autonomy 
and self-governance values.” (Spiro, 2010, p. 130). 
Thomas Faist et al theorize the growth of tolerance towards dual citizenship as 
path – dependent process. They argue that the concept of the path – dependency in 
the context of citizenship politics basically means that: 
 […] once political actors have started to move along a certain path – tolerating dual nationality 
under certain circumstances such as children out of binational marriages - there is every incentive to 
continue along the same way, and serious disincentives exist to reverse course. The original incentives 
for starting down the path may arise out of different contexts, e.g., dual nationality as a tool for social 
and political integration in immigration countries, or dual nationality as a means used by emigration 
country governments to maintain the loyalty of expatriates (Faist et al., 2004, p. 914). 
Therefore, it is argued further that the increase of dual and multiple citizenships 
worldwide can be explained via processes of growing emphasis on individual rights 
vis-à-vis nation state prerogatives and sovereignty. The de jure tolerance towards 
plural citizenships has increased because of developments at inter-, supra- and 
national-levels which are related to changed understandings of integration of 
immigrants, nationhood and political systems in general (Faist et al., 2004, p. 924). 
The notion that the tolerance towards plural citizenship has increased because of 
processes of mobility and migration is strengthened by Thomas Faist and Jürgen 
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Gerdes in the article “Dual Citizenship in an Age of Mobility” (2008). It is stated that 
a question of whether dual citizenship should be allowed usually comes up when the 
discussion turns to integration of the immigrants. The importance of societal, political 
and economic integration of the immigrants has risen prominently with increase of 
the immigrants and extent of migration in general. The right to integrate and be 
regarded as true citizens has been considered as a human right. Dual – citizenship has 
been argued to be a tool to promote naturalization and consequently full integration 
into a host society. The article concludes: “In a mobile world, dual citizenship will 
nonetheless continue to grow as new immigrants and their children strive to become 
full members of liberal democratic communities” (Faist and Gerdes, 2008, p. 15). 
It is clear from these three articles that the main theorizing of the dual citizenship 
is very much related to frameworks of the human rights, integration of immigrants 
and international political realities nowadays. Dual citizenship is increasingly viewed 
as human and political right and as a logical consequence of processes of migration 
and globalization in general. The theories of the dual citizenship mentioned above 
reveal that the understanding of citizenship is instrumental. The citizenship is 
understood as the instrument for achieving equality among different members of 
society and as a convenient tool to adjust to realities of the globalized world.  
2.1. Previous research on the dual citizenship policies  
 
 A number of scholars attempted to analyze the politics of dual – citizenship 
worldwide and estimate numbers of states which allow and tolerate dual or multiple 
citizenship and which do not. One of the most informative studies was carried out by 
Joachim K. Blatter, Stefanie Erdmann and Katja Schwanke and is called “Acceptance 
of Dual Citizenship: Empirical Data and Political Contexts” (2009). A great research 
was conducted. The empirical data of historical developments in the regulations of 
citizenship policies and political contexts was analyzed. The overview of current dual 
citizenship research is presented in their paper which concludes that from 189 
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countries analyzed 73 countries accepts dual citizenship, 53 do not accept dual 
citizenship, 24 countries accept very limitedly, 14 countries which accept dual 
citizenship with treaty nations or tolerate dual citizenship de facto, and 25 countries 
with inconsistent results (Blatter et al., 2009, p.10). What is more, they carried out 
their own survey by sending questionnaires to 100 experts in 50 countries. They 
conclude that:  
Our data reveals the high political salience of citizenship regulations in many countries and the 
fact that the acceptance of dual citizenship is often a very controversial aspect of citizenship reforms. 
In line with the data in the first part of the paper, our data shows a steady trend towards broader 
acceptance of dual citizenship. Furthermore, we discover a trend towards more symmetric regulations 
of dual citizenship insofar that emigrants and immigrants are treated similar (Blatter et al., 2009, p. 
31). 
It is important to mention that they also sent a questionnaire to Lithuania which 
was answered and the answers of the expert are very much related to the past and 
nowadays realities regarding politics of the citizenship and dual citizenship. Lithuania 
is one of the three countries of the survey, others – South Korea and Austria, in which 
dual citizenship is de jure not accepted and de facto minimized because of almost no 
exceptions and strong controls (Blatter et al., 2009, p. 31). 
Most of the studies of dual citizenship politics concentrate on the Western states 
which experience relatively high immigration flows like Germany, France, and 
Canada, Great Britain or the EU countries after 2004. Therefore, the previously 
mentioned theories which regard dual citizenship as a part of the immigrants’ 
integration and acceptance are dominating the field (see Dahlin and Hironaka 2008; 
Brøndsted Sejersen, 2008; Morje Howard, 2005; Bloemraad, 2004; Faist, 2007). As a 
result, research on the dual citizenship in the Western states strengthens the notion 
that dual citizenship is the instrument for achieving certain objectives in certain 
societies and is the expression of human rights. The following part analyzes the 
research of the dual citizenship and what purposes does it have in the Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
 
11 
 
2.3. Research on dual citizenship politics in the Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Studies regarding citizenship and dual citizenship politics in the Eastern Europe 
and the post-soviet and the post-communist states are considerably fewer. 
The research which analyzes dual citizenship politics in the Eastern Europe or 
the post-communist states usually concentrates on Poland, Hungary, Romania, and 
Moldova. Poland attracts scholars because of its huge diaspora. Hungary and 
Romania are analyzed because of their kin minorities and ethnic tensions. Constantin 
Iordachi in the “Dual Citizenship in Post-communist Central and Eastern Europe: 
Regional Integration and Inter-ethnic Tensions” compares Western Europe dual 
citizenship politics with Central and Eastern Europe politics. According to Iordachi: 
In accounting for the global proliferation of dual citizenship, I will show in this paper that in 
Western Europe and North America, the spread of dual citizenship has been motivated by the need to 
integrate permanent residents, being thus linked to the phenomena of globalisation and labour 
migration, increasing cultural pluralism, and forms of multiple socio-political identities. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, policies of dual citizenship have been related to the revival of national and ethnic 
policies of post-communist states, addressing the need for more effective minority protection. These 
features account for the major difference in the expansion of dual citizenship in the two regions: dual 
membership has been primarily granted to internal permanent-residents in the West, but to external and 
compact kin populations in the East (Iordachi, 2006, p. 106). 
Iordachi shows that the expansions of the dual citizenship in the West and in the 
East are based on different reasons. The dual citizenship politics in the Eastern and 
Central Europe are related to national and ethnic issues in the region while the states 
in the West are mostly concerned with the immigration and human rights.  
The politics of the dual citizenship in Poland are analyzed in the context of 
emigration and a huge Polish population residing outside Poland. It has been argued 
that in Poland de facto tolerance of the dual citizenship is quite uncontroversial 
because of an importance to maintain good relations and cultural ties with Polish 
diaspora. There is basically no public attention to questions of multiculturalism and 
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immigration, therefore dual citizenship is tolerated selectively and does not include 
dual citizenship rights for immigrants (Gorny, et al, 2007, p. 165).  
The case of Poland reveals again that the politics of dual citizenship are 
understood differently and used for different purposes than in the Western states. The 
reasoning for toleration of the dual citizenship is based on the ethnical and national 
aspirations and objectives to maintain connections with Poles worldwide. The 
concept of the dual citizenship is also understood differently in the post-soviet states, 
especially in the Baltic States. The following parts of the thesis will expand on that.  
2.4. Research on the citizenship politics in the Baltic States  
 
Some research has been done on the citizenship politics in the Baltic States.  
Olivier Danjoux wrote the dissertation thesis on the concepts of citizenship in 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia after re-gaining Independence after break-up of the 
Soviet Union “L’ETAT, C’EST PAS MOI Reframing Citizenship(s) in the Baltic 
Republics” (2002). Danjoux analysis of the citizenship politics in Baltic States is 
historically deep, all – inclusive and full of important insights. He concludes that:  
I found that the kind of citizenship now developing in the Baltic countries does not fit under a 
single heading. It is informed both by legacies from the Soviet period and by the specific conditions 
under which these societies are extracting themselves from the Soviet experience. Citizenship has been 
reframed both as a means to reject the Soviet experience, as a means to manage the concrete legacies 
of that experience, and as a necessary principle of collective democratic organization (Danjoux, 2002, 
p. 323). 
This is to say that the politics of the citizenship in the Baltic States are somehow 
different both from Western States and Central and Eastern European states. The 
Baltic countries fall not only in the category of the post-communist states but also in 
the category of the post-soviet states which means they were incorporated in the 
Soviet Union during the Second World War. This also means that all three states have 
a certain post-soviet legacy, for example, Russian minorities residing in the Baltic 
States after the breakup of the Soviet Union with which they dealt differently and this 
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influenced the formation of the citizenship policies after 1990. The politics of the 
citizenship in the Baltic States are further analyzed in the theoretical framework of 
the nation-state building in the post-soviet states.  
Kristine Kruma in “Lithuanian nationality: Trump card to independence and its 
current challenges” (2009) presents a historical overview and analysis of the 
citizenship policies in Lithuania since 1989. The principles of acquisition and loss of 
the Lithuanian citizenship are deeply analyzed and current political debates are 
presented. The dual citizenship was restricted ever since the adoption of the 1991 
Law on Citizenship and The Constitution of Lithuania written in 1992. The 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has delegitimized nearly 30 
statutory and sub-statutory dual citizenship law’s provisions and omissions because 
these conflicted with the principles of citizenship written in the Constitution (Kruma, 
2009, p. 98). The politics of the citizenship in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are 
analyzed deeply further in the thesis.  
3. Theoretical framework: The nation-building in the post-soviet states 
 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union raised many concerns for politicians in 
the post-soviet states and many questions for the political scientists. Some questioned 
the possibilities of democratization and liberalization in the post-soviet sphere, some 
were excited about the breakup of the world’s largest remaining empire, and some 
were interested in how post-soviet republics are going to establish or re-establish their 
independent nation-states. Therefore, the theory of the nation-building is one of the 
dominating theories that explain how the post-soviet states coped with post-colonial 
legacy and how they created their own political identity as the nation-states. The 
nation-building in the post-soviet states, as I argue, greatly influenced the formation 
of the citizenship politics and the formation of national identities. Who were defined 
as the citizens in the post-soviet states, resulted from the processes of the nation-
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building. What is more important, the citizenship politics largely depended on what 
form this nation-building took and what purpose did it have. At the same time, the 
politics of the citizenship was one of the most important tools in the nation-building. 
It can be argued that the nation-building and the citizenship politics were very 
intertwined in the post-soviet states. The one could not be done without the other. 
What is more, it is difficult to separate which process influenced the other more. This 
notion will be analyzed in more extent in the following parts of the thesis. 
The terms nation-building and state-building are usually used interchangeably 
in some scholarly literature. However, the concept of nation-building is more 
normative and includes aspirations of creating or re-creating certain national 
identities within the territory of the state. According to Harris Mylonas: “Legitimate 
authority in modern national states is connected to popular rule, to majorities. Nation-
building is the process through which these majorities are constructed (Mylonas, 
2012, p. 17). In other words, the nation-building refers to processes of defining and 
fostering people’s national identity and their sense of belonging to certain community 
based on shared history, language, culture, and ethnicity. The term state-building on 
the other hand, refers to the creation of institutions of the functioning state which 
inspire the loyalty of the people, and defining state boundaries that are accepted by 
the majority of the political elite (Tolz, 1998, p. 993). 
It is useful also to conceptualize what is a nation if this thesis analyzes the 
politics of the nation-building in the post-soviet states – what the post-soviet states 
were trying to build. In this thesis the nation is defined as:  
“a group of people with one or more specific cultural traits whose members (1) 
think of themselves and are thought of by others as being part of it and (2) endorse a 
political program aimed at enhancing or maintaining a system of individual and/or 
collective rights and privileges” (Janmaat, 2000, p. 33).  
According to this definition of the nation, the post-soviet republics were 
building a certain group of people who were perceived as belonging to that group 
based on shared culture, history, and other national traits. This nation-state building 
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encompassed various political programs to strengthen and maintaining a political 
system which would be able to secure certain individual and collective claims of that 
nation. As it is argued in this thesis, one of the most important political programs in 
the post-soviet states was defining citizenship and who are citizens of those particular 
nation-states.  
 In the post-soviet republics both nation-building and state-building took place 
at the same time. Democratic institutions had to be created, market had to be 
liberalized, new political elites had to be elected and the people had to be prepared for 
the economic and institutional changes. The processes of the nation-building and the 
state-building were closely intertwined in the post-soviet states. It may be argued 
whether the nation-building is a part of the state-building or vice versa or maybe they 
go parallel. However, I argue, that in the case of post-soviet states the nation-building 
process had a significant impact on the processes of creation of the institutions and 
policies because the political elites tend to have an interest of harmonizing the 
territorial and the national units through the construction of a common national 
identity among the population (Mylonas, 2012, p. 17-18). The politics of the nation-
building were essential in the sense that newly independent societies in the post-
soviet republics needed to be united under the term nation first, in order to create 
successful and legitimate institutions governing these states. As I argue further, the 
politics of citizenship played a major role in processes of the nation-building in the 
post-soviet states. The politics of citizenship is a leading factor in the initial steps in 
deciding how nation is going to be defined and built and who is going to constitute 
the nation.  
While the collapse of the Soviet Union was at least to some extent a surprise for 
the world, for the ethnic political elites in some soviet states it was not so unexpected. 
The political elites in the Baltic States, Transcaucasia and Ukraine were preparing for 
this event for some time before The USSR actually collapsed. The idea of 
Independence was always alive among dissidents and intellectuals in the most of the 
soviet republics (Gachechiladze, 1997, p. 51). 
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Some scholars argue that the Soviet Union can be analyzed as a colonial 
empire. The Soviet Union fits the definition of the empire because it had a defined 
core (Moscow and Russian SFSR) and non-core peripheries – the non-Russian 
republics. Moscow and Russian SFSR represented the imperial state and the political 
elite within peripheries were ruled by state administrators. If an empire is defined as a 
relation, formal or informal, in which one state controls political sovereignty of 
another political state and society, the Soviet Union fits this definition (Kuzio, 
2002,p. 242).        
The notion that the Soviet Union may be conceptualized as the empire is 
backed up by other scholars as well. Even if some authors did not like calling the 
Soviet Union “an empire”, a historical revisionism changed it. The Soviet Union is 
being reinvented as the empire in most of the scholarly literature lately because more 
scholars and politicians acknowledge that it was illegitimate, composed polity which 
was unable to stop rising nationalism within it. As it was mentioned before, in the 
Soviet Union the center (Moscow) dominate the periphery (the soviet republics) to 
the disadvantage to the latter. The Soviet republics were subjected to inequality and 
subordination. What is more, the incorporation to the Soviet Union was usually 
carried out brutally with military means followed by coercive technologies to pacify 
the resistance in the soviet republics (Smith, 1998, p. 3-4).  
If the Soviet Union may be analyzed as the colonial power, after its 
disintegration newly formed nation-states have entered a post-colonial phase. 
Therefore, they had to deal with certain Soviet imperial legacy. The state and nation-
building policies in some of the post-soviet republics were aimed at removing that 
legacy and are similar to ones adopted by other states with the post-colonial legacy. 
The term ‘de-Sovietisation’ is widely used to describe the processes of removing the 
Soviet legacy. Inside the term ‘de-Sovietisation’ there was also a  notion that meant 
that ‘the other’, mainly but not exclusively Russian minority, are not to be trusted and 
especially in the Baltic States it was believed that ‘de-Sovietisation’ is going to be 
finished when the Russian minority returns to reside in Russia (Smith, 1998, p. 14).  
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The states are biased to different degrees in the way they define they titular 
group, culture, language, historiography and symbols. The post-soviet states have 
inherited ethno cultural understanding of nationhood as a result of Soviet nationality 
policies and have been as certain ethnic homelands to where its titular ethnic group 
and language should theoretically coincide and dominate. In reality, however, the 
soviet republics experienced some threats to their culture, language, collective 
memory and symbols. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were heavily Russified and 
became bilingual if not dominated by Russian language. Some soviet non-Russian 
republics experienced heavy in-migration of Russians (Kuzio, 2002, p. 250).  
The Russian minority, Russian language and erosion of national history and 
memory can be considered to be a large part of Soviet legacy to the post-soviet states. 
The question arises – how newly formed nation-states in the post-soviet sphere dealt 
with this Soviet legacy? As Tarias Kuzo argues: “A central aspect of overcoming this 
legacy is re-claiming the past from the framework imposed by the former imperial 
core and thereby creating, or reviving, a national historiography that helps to 
consolidate the new national state. All states including those traditionally defined as 
lying in the “civic West,” have in the past—and continue to—use national 
historiography, myths, and legends as a component of their national identities.” 
(Kuzio, 2002, p. 241).  
In order to revive certain national historiography, the post-soviet states had to 
turn back to their so-called “golden age” to confirm that they had distinctive national 
histories. According to Kuzio:  
Post-Soviet states are in the process of searching for their “lost” history in the preimperial era in 
order to confirm that they possess “golden eras” and a workable past that can be used to legitimize 
their newly independent states. This is particularly important where territory remains contested 
between the former imperial metropolis and the post-colonial state. All nations require elements of 
common descent where contemporary unity is transported back in time (Kuzio, 2002, p. 249). 
Therefore, the post-soviet states turned back to their pre-Tsarist and pre-Soviet 
histories in order to create a basis for the nation-state building in newly independent 
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states. What is more, newly independent nation-states had to decide how to define 
their political communities and it is argued that this could not be done objectively:  
In the same manner as in all other civic states, post-Soviet states cannot be objective when 
deciding questions such as how will the political community be defined (by the titular nation or by the 
titular nation and Russians), what national historiography will be used, should the former metropolis 
be defined as the “Other,” will the state have one titular or two (the titular nation and Russian) state 
languages and what state symbols (flag, national anthem, symbol) will be chosen (Kuzio, 2002, p. 
249). 
 In some post-soviet states, notably Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, the Soviet legacy 
being Russian minorities and territorial disputes, the political elites have made some 
disputed decisions after first years of independence and wanted to eliminate all Soviet 
legacies. To conclude, in all of newly independent nation-states Soviet legacy has 
caused certain conflicts and unease in the processes of the nation-building and in the 
formation of the citizenship politics.  
4.1. The post-soviet geopolitics, the nation-state building and citizenship 
 
The nation-building processes in the post-soviet sphere were influenced by 
certain factors. One of the dominating factors was the geopolitical context. After the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union a number of territorial conflicts have occurred on 
the margins of the multiethnic state. In the European part of former USSR the 
conflicts were less frequent but nationalist issues were still visible and disturbing. 
Some conflicts were territorial while others were related to the rights of the Russian 
diaspora in some of the post-soviet republics. The breakup of the Soviet Union raised 
many questions about its territorial claims, especially in those territories where the 
Russian population was significantly larger. The geopolitical thinking is central in 
Russia’s understanding of its place in the world and plays an important role in 
Russia’s foreign affairs policies. 
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          It is important to mention that geopolitics is not merely a concept to describe 
physical borders among states and power struggles which take place within those 
borders anymore. As Tsygankov further states: 
 Geopolitics, however, is not and should not be viewed as a discipline that studies primordial 
geographical factors and helps to understand countries’ ‘natural’ or ‘objective’ politics. Although 
many in the West and Russia continue to theorize and practice this kind of geopolitics, they mislead 
themselves and do a disservice to their respective countries. A narrow focus on ‘objectively defined’ 
national interests or ‘natural’ institutions — whether they are Western-style liberal democracy or 
Russian autocracy and self-sufficiency — deprives us of possibilities of creative participation in 
shaping and re-shaping political space for common human interests. Vision of world order inspired by 
this old-style essentialist geopolitics often produces negative perceptions and confrontations in the 
world, thereby undermining the very peace and stability sought by their authors (Tsygankov, 2003, 
p.105). 
The concept of new geopolitics, on the other hand, emphasizes a socially 
constructed geopolitical thinking and imagination and draws attention to possibilities 
of re-shaping and re-evaluation of geographical spaces and political order beyond the 
tradition understanding of borders and boundaries. The advocates of new 
understanding of geopolitics argue that it is not enough to study certain state practices 
towards other states. It is argued that historiographies, national myths and symbols 
need to be included in order to understand those practices properly. Moreover, the 
concepts of boundaries and borders need a broader perspective. The concept of 
boundaries is not only about power and domination in the certain region. The new 
geopolitics is concerned as much with physical geography of maps of the states as it 
is with maps of meanings. The border setting practices are conceptual and 
cartographic, imaginary and actual. Such perception of geopolitics put a great 
emphasis on the concepts of identity, security, or proximity, and maintains that these 
concepts cannot be entirely neutral or objective. The concepts mentioned become a 
reflection of those who use them (Tsygankov, 2003, p. 105). This is to say that 
geopolitical imagination and thinking are subjective and constructed and in a way 
represent certain state’s historiography. It also affects how states perceive themselves 
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in the global world and in the certain region and what role they think they have in the 
global politics.  
In order to understand why certain post-soviet states were concerned about 
post-soviet geopolitics, the role and identity of Russia in the post-soviet region needs 
to be analyzed. The concept of Russian identity plays a significant part in Russia’s 
geopolitical thinking. The Russian national identity was always related to an empire. 
Russian nation-building historically coincide with empire-building. The crisis of 
Russian identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union is very much related to the fact 
that ethnic Russians did not see their ethnic republic as their homeland. The 
homeland for Russians was the entire USSR, the policy which led to confusion of 
Russian and Soviet identities. Russians were ‘the elder brother’ and the ‘leading 
nation’ of the Soviet Union (Kuzio, 2002, p. 242). On the contrary, the non-Russians 
in the post-soviet republics saw their ethnic republics as their homelands. Therefore, 
redefining their homeland was a complicated process for Russians and for Russian 
politics.  As Kuzio argues:  
[…] although Russia has not launched military aggression against any former Soviet state to 
back up territorial claims, it has remained difficult for it to reconcile 'Russian' identity to that 
encompassed within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russia's psychological map of its 'borders' 
are not those of the Russian Federation; many of its elites often confuse the borders of the former 
USSR/Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with those of 'Russia' and not those of the Russian 
Federation (Kuzio, 1997, p. 38).  
As the Federation of Russia still struggles to make peace with its new identity, 
many scholars have discussed and questioned the role that Russia will take upon in 
the globalized world. The concerns about Russia’s geopolitical identity after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union have stimulated a rise in geopolitical thinking and 
geopolitical imagination in Russia. Some argued that Russia’s role will decrease 
significantly in the post-soviet region; however it appeared to be false assumptions. 
According to A. P. Tsygankov:  
I argue that despite the expectations of some scholars and policy-makers, Russia did not retreat 
from the Eurasian geographical space and in fact is keenly interested in securing its cultural, political, 
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and economic presence there. The majority of Russian elites and intellectuals are convinced that 
without answering larger questions of the post-Soviet space and its politico-economic re-organization, 
the nation will not be able to adequately meet its domestic challenges, such as political stabilization 
and economic development. The Russian majority shares the premise that both Russia’s domestic 
problems and the conflicts on the country’s periphery are largely geopolitical in nature and would be 
best resolved on a basis of an overarching geopolitical vision and strategy, rather than separately or on 
an ad hoc basis (Tsygankov, 2003, p. 102). 
 The role of the Russian minorities in the post-soviet states plays an important 
part in Russia’s and the post-soviet states geopolitical thinking. As it was mentioned 
above, this particular minority symbolizes the post-soviet legacy and for some post-
soviet states – Soviet occupation. For Russian Federation it symbolizes the sphere of 
glorious historical past and nowadays a potential sphere of influence in the post-
soviet republics. The Russian diaspora legitimated an active Russian engagement in 
the internal and external affairs in the post-soviet states. The concerns about the rights 
of Russian minorities in post-soviet states became a significant part of Russia’s 
political discourse and the foreign policy objective. The frequent targets were the 
Baltic States. Russia used these concerns about the perceived violations of ethnic 
Russians minority rights to threaten Latvia with cutting oil exports (King and Melvin, 
1999, p. 121).  
The post-soviet region and Russia’s relation with it plays an important role in 
Russia’s foreign policy and geopolitical thinking. The post-soviet states are important 
for Russia because of various reasons like fear of ethnic conflicts which may 
influence Russia negatively, the need to preserve economic ties with this region and 
find allies, but most importantly, to secure the approximately 25 million Russian 
diaspora as it was mentioned above.  Russia perceives the post-soviet states as “near 
abroad” which implies that these states are not so “foreign” as other and are subjected 
to different set of rules and treatment. Some imply that these states fall under the 
Russian sphere of influence (Kubicek, 1999, p. 556). 
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In case of some post-soviet states, the Baltic States in particular, the perception 
that they are in the Russian sphere of influence and are subjected to different 
treatment, is not welcomed. For the Baltic States it largely means insecurity and 
Russian “near abroad” politics are perceived to be threatening the survival of the 
independent nation-state. The Russian minorities are perceived as the source of threat 
from Russia as well. This perception was strengthened by the statements made by 
Russian authorities that justified military intervention in order ‘to protect Russian 
citizens’ in 2008 when the military conflict broke out between Georgia and Russia. 
Georgia was blamed for violating Russian minorities, who was believed by Russia to 
be Russian citizens, rights and therefore, Russia justified the concept of responsibility 
to protect. This Russian claim was rejected and resulted in many questions and 
observations. It has been argued that this military intervention was more of the 
Russian show of its military power and ambitions in the “near abroad”. According to 
D. Steinberg:  
[…] international observers questioned whether the primary purpose of the Russian military 
intervention was to protect South Ossetian civilians or instead to establish full Russian control over 
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where there was no claim of genocide; to dismantle Georgia’s 
military capability; to scuttle its NATO ambitions; and to send a clear signal to other former parts of 
the Soviet Union as to what would and would not be tolerated by Moscow. In addition, the 
introduction of some 20,000 troops and 100 tanks not only into South Ossetia but also into Abkhazia 
and Georgia proper appeared manifestly excessive. The Russian naval blockade in the Black Sea as 
well as aerial bombings of Gori, Poti, the Zugdidi region and an aviation plant in Tbilisi went well 
beyond the necessary minimum (Steinberg, 2009, p. 439). 
What is more, the fact the Russia did not seek approval from the UN Security 
Council for this military intervention shows that Russia is determined to pursue its 
geopolitical objectives and does not comply easily to international pressure. I argue 
that the cited paragraph above concludes very well what some of the post-soviet 
states may be afraid of. The geopolitical insecurity is perceived to come from Russia, 
especially in the case of the Baltic States and Georgia. 
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If we assume that geopolitical thinking and imagination are constructed and 
subjective, it raises many interesting questions about the certain state’s geopolitical 
identity and how certain state understands its geopolitical environment and 
neighboring states. In the context of post-soviet states it is important to mention that 
the geopolitics of the post-soviet region was constructed of two directions: from 
Russia’s perspective and certain post-soviet republic’s perspective. It is also 
important to stress out that those geopolitical perspectives were directed towards each 
other. At the same time, geopolitical imagination both of Russia and of the post-
soviet republics was greatly influenced by national historiographies and mythical 
pasts. Moreover, in some cases, notably the Baltic States, Ukraine, Armenia, 
geopolitical thinking of the post-soviet republic conflicted with the geopolitical 
thinking of Russia. Some post-soviet republics did not mind joining The 
Commonwealth of Independent States, an organization which was intended to replace 
certain characteristics of the Soviet Union. However, others rejected this idea and 
tried to abolish any possibility of joining not only the same organizations as Russia 
but also any Soviet legacy and identification with it. The Russian minorities residing 
in certain post-soviet republics were also perceived as threat. 
To some up, the nation-building processes in the post-soviet states took place in 
the certain geopolitical context and the politics of nation-building in certain states 
reflected the geopolitical thinking of those states. For some newly independent states 
geopolitical context of that time did not play a major role in their state and nation-
building while for other newly formed nation-states this geopolitical context appeared 
to be threatening to their own nation-building because of the certain historiography 
and experiences. As the result, the politics of the nation-building and citizenship were 
formed accordingly to the perceived threats and insecurity in the geopolitical context.  
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5. The citizenship politics in the post-soviet states 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the fundamental questions of the 
citizenship politics emerged in the post-soviet republics. The questions regarding 
citizenship were an essential part of the nation-building process and a problematic 
issue as well. The Soviet legacy, mostly the Russian minorities in non-Russian states, 
has played an important role in the construction of the citizenship politics as well as it 
disturbed them as well. 
The politics of membership and citizenship in the post-soviet republics is a 
large subject. It encompasses many different but related issues and struggles over 
identities and loyalties, inclusion and exclusion, the nature of the state, the belonging 
of the state, the relation between culture and politics, private and public life 
(Brubaker, 1992, p. 273). These issues were dealt differently in different post-soviet 
states and for the interest of this thesis only the Baltic States and Lithuania in 
particular are analyzed in more details.   
In order to show one of the problematic aspects of the citizenship politics in the 
post-soviet states, the understanding of the citizenship in the Soviet Union has to be 
analyzed first. It has been argued that the Soviet understanding of the citizenship as 
something separate from nationality and nationhood has caused certain problems in 
the post-soviet states, especially in those with big Russian minorities. Brubaker 
explains:  
The Soviet Union has collapsed, but the contradictory legacy of its unique accommodation to 
ethnonational heterogeneity lives on. That accommodation pivoted on institutionalized 
multinationality. The Soviet Union was a multinational state not only in ethnodemographic terms - not 
only in terms of the extraordinary ethnic heterogeneity of its population - but, more fundamentally in 
institutional terms. The Soviet state not only passively tolerated but actively institutionalized the 
existence of multiple nations and nationalities as constitutive elements of the state and its citizenry. It 
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codified nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from statehood 
and citizenship (Brubaker, 1994, p. 49).   
The nationality and nationhood in the Soviet Union were institutionalized 
exclusively on the sub-state level rather than the state-wide level. The Soviet Union 
was never institutionalized as a nation-state but it was not a consequence of the fact 
that the Soviet Union was multiethnic state. This was rather the result of how ethnic 
heterogeneity was institutionalized and ethnic nationality was aligned with the 
organization of the public sphere. Brubaker explains how the Soviet nationality 
regime was different:  
Thus the Soviet Union was neither conceived in theory nor organized in practice as a nation-
state. Yet while it did not define the state or citizenry as a whole in national terms, it did define 
component parts of the state and the citizenry in national terms. Herein lies the distinctiveness of the 
Soviet nationality regime - in its unprecedented displacement of nationhood and nationality, as 
organizing principles of the social and political order, from the state-wide to the sub-state level. No 
other state has gone so far in sponsoring, codifying, institutionalizing, even (in some cases) inventing 
nationhood and nationality on the sub-state level, while at the same time doing nothing to 
institutionalize them on the level of the state as a whole (Brubaker, 1994, p. 52). 
In a way the Soviet Union was encouraging and strengthening the nationalisms 
in the soviet-republics but there was practically no space left for autonomous political 
processes there. What is more, the perception of what is citizenship in the Soviet 
Union was confusing in a way the people were citizens of the republic and of the 
Soviet Union but the republic’s citizenship was perceived to be not important. The 
passports identified nationality but not citizenship:  
At the same time there were intrinsic impediments to the nation-state formation on the basis of 
the Union republics, one of them being the actual absence of the citizenship of a Union republic: 
although theoretically people were simultaneously the citizens of a republic and the USSR as a whole, 
the latter was overwhelmingly superior in importance. Being a citizen of a Union republic meant 
actually nothing, much more important being a point in the internal passport identifying nationality, 
not a republic’s citizenship (Gachechiladze, 1997 p. 53).  
Brubaker further argues that the Soviet Union was never organized as the 
Russian nation-state. The Russians were perceived as belonging to the Soviet Union. 
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Therefore, after the breakup of the Soviet Union when the post-soviet republics were 
being organized as the nation-states based on the ethnic majority, some 25 million 
ethnic Russians found themselves outside the territory of now Russian Federation. 
These Russians have become new national minorities in the post-soviet states and this 
resulted in a question: where do they belong? Minority elites tend to represent the 
minority as belonging to another nation. In the case of the Russian minorities in the 
post-soviet republics, the political elite in Russian Federation see these minorities as 
belonging to Russia (Brubaker, 1994, p. 72).  
Therefore, the some of the most important questions that the post-soviet 
political elites had to answer are: who constitutes the citizenry of this particular 
nation? Who belongs to the nation-state? Who are thought to be loyal to the newly 
created nation-state and who are to be trusted? Who are to be included and excluded? 
To what extent citizenship should coincide with ethnicity? (Brubaker, 1996, p. 43). 
The political authorities in the post-soviet states had to answer these questions from 
the very beginning of independent statehood after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 
a sense, these post-soviet republics were choosing their citizenry in order to secure 
newly independent nation-states and ensure smooth and progressing processes of the 
nation and state-building. This way the citizenship politics reflect the interests of the 
nation-states.  
Some may ask why the Russian minorities were important when the politics of 
the citizenship in the post-soviet republics were formed. Firstly, the conflict of 
belonging of those Russian minorities was clear both for Russian minority and non-
Russian post-soviet republics. Second of all, the decisions of whether the ethnic 
Russians should be included as citizens of newly independent nation-states were 
greatly influenced by geopolitics and national historiography. These notions resulted 
in the perception that the question whether Russians should become citizens of non-
Russian post-soviet states were of great importance in the processes of the nation-
building. Some post-soviet states like Latvia and Estonia decided to exclude the 
Russian minority from broader citizenship rights. The next part of the thesis analyzes 
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the reasons for that and the citizenship politics in the Baltic States via the geopolitical 
thinking and the nation-state building processes in these states.  
 
6. The Nation-building and the politics of the citizenship in The Baltic States 
 
Some post-soviet states were more successful in the nation-building and 
democratic transition than others. Of all fifteen post-soviet republics only the Baltic 
States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - are consolidated democracies and only they 
are the members of the European Union and NATO. The Baltic States may be 
distinguished from other post-soviet states also because after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union they were the ones to re-build their nation-states. The Baltic States were 
independent nation-states in the interwar period and they experienced being 
incorporated into the Soviet Union in a similar way in 1940.  
The Baltic States nationalism and nation-building was different from other 
post-soviet states because of interwar statehood and subsequent international refusal 
to recognize their incorporation into the Soviet Union. The re-claiming the past 
national historiography was especially essential in the Baltic States because they have 
been the last ones incorporated into the Soviet Union and this act was always 
considered to be illegal and illegitimate.  
As the result, the Baltic States in the academic literature are usually considered 
to be established states because of their history of internationally recognized 
statehood in the interwar period. In the established states the politics of citizenship 
may concern two questions. First of all, what rules should govern naturalization? 
Second of all, what rules should govern the continuous assignment of state’s 
citizenship, usually by birth? New states, to the contrary, have to decide how the 
initial body of citizens should be constituted (Brubaker, 1992, p. 277). 
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Because of interwar statehood and independence and international community’s 
refusal to recognize their incorporation in the Soviet Union, the Baltic States are in 
the different place regarding the issues of the citizenship from other post-soviet 
republics. The nationalist political elites in the Baltic States can argue that these states 
are not successors of the Soviet Union. They are successors of the interwar republics, 
therefore, they are not new states and they do not need to define their initial body of 
citizens. It has been argued that their states and citizenship have continued to exist de 
jure if not de facto because the incorporation in the Soviet Union was illegal and 
illegitimate. Therefore, all they need to do is to restore the citizenships of those who 
lived in those states interwar period and to their descendants. Everybody else should 
be regarded as foreigners and they are eligible to acquire the citizenship through 
naturalization but they should not be defined as citizens (Brubaker, 1992, p. 278). 
As it was mentioned earlier, the nation-building in the Baltic States was greatly 
based on the principle of restoration. The principle of restoration played a significant 
role in the 1988-1991 chain of events in which the Baltic States re-entered the arena 
of the international politics. The governing elites in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
perceived their states of the interwar successor states to the interwar de jure republics 
and also accounted for de facto re-emergence of geopolitics in these three states. The 
Baltic elite this time tried to escape the geopolitical context of ‘the East’ and strive 
forwards the geopolitical realities of ‘the West’. Because of this new direction of the 
Baltic States in the geopolitical map, the elites in these Baltic States had to re-map 
both external and internal spaces of state sovereignty because they believed that 
‘going West’ required it. Aalto suggests that the mappings of external and internal 
spaces of the Baltic States should be called as ‘restorationist geopolitics’. The 
restorationist geopolitics in the Baltic States was about invoking a dichotomous 
differentiation of Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian identity from Russian minority 
residing in the state, and a spatial and territorial differentiation from Russia. The both 
identity and spatial differentiations were affected by security concerns (Aalto, 2000, 
p. 66).  
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Therefore, it can be assumed that the politics of nation-building in the Baltic 
States were highly influenced by the perceived security concerns posed by Russian 
minority and broader geopolitical context. The Russian population in Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia was considered to be troubling because of feared military 
intervention from Russia in order to “protect its people”. However, the Baltic States 
represent cases of nationalisms which were successfully taken under control: 
responding to the international pressure before accession to the EU, the Baltic States 
governments made important changes in their citizenship and other laws which made 
exclusionary ethnic states into civic political communities (Budrytė, 2011, p. 14).  
In the late 1980’s significant numbers of residents of the Baltic States supported 
independence despite the activities of pro-soviet groups created to counter 
nationalisms in these states. The elections to the Supreme Soviet Parliaments were 
held in March 1990 in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These elections were the first 
multiparty elections held in the Soviet Union and as many argue, they were 
equivalent of the referendum on independence. The elections were surprisingly 
inclusive: non-communist parties and even military Soviet personnel were allowed to 
participate. The nationalist successive powers have won the elections and in the 
spring of 1991 referendums on independence were held. All residents were allowed 
to vote and the answer to independence was a strong “yes”. In Lithuania 90 % of 
residents supported independence, in Latvia – 74% and in Estonia – 78% (Budrytė, 
2011, p. 15).  
In the lights of these events one of the major issues that the ruling elites in the 
Baltic States was the issue of citizenship. They were willing to accept that the future 
independent state may include those who migrated to the Baltic States during the 
Soviet occupation – Russian minority. However, the politics of citizenship were 
focused on the survival of the newly independent states. The debates over citizenship 
in Latvia and Estonia were strongly restorationist. The restorationists in Estonia 
argued that citizenship should be restrictive:  
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After more than a year of debate (1990–91), those favouring restrictive citizenship laws 
triumphed. In February 1992, the old Citizenship Law from 1938 was reinstated. Those who held 
Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940, and their descendants (approximately 900,000 people, or 
approximately 58 % of the population), automatically became citizens of post-Soviet Estonia. The 
naturalisation process for other residents (more than 400,000 people, or approximately 26 % of the 
population) included the following requirements: residence in the territory of Estonia for at least the 
previous two years, a one-year waiting period, proficiency in the Estonian language, and an oath of 
loyalty to the State (Budrytė, 2011, p. 16-17). 
The political community building in Latvia was similar in many ways – it was 
exclusive and restrictive: 
In October 1991, the Supreme Council restored Latvian citizenship only to those who had been 
citizens of Latvia in 1940 and their descendants. This left more than 700,000 people, or approximately 
28 % of Latvia’s residents, without Latvian citizenship. Most of these people were Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belorussians (Budrytė, 2011, p. 17).  
In Latvia and Estonia the initial politics of citizenship were based on fear of 
Russian-speaking residents and memory of terror during Stalin’s era and 
Russification policies adopted during years of occupation. These restrictive 
citizenship policies resulted in Russia blaming Estonian and Latvian governments in 
violation of human rights and received various criticisms from certain international 
organizations for human rights as well as the EU.  
Lithuania, on the other hand, dealt with non-Lithuanian minorities quite 
differently and was not monitored internationally that much. While the citizenship 
politics were intensively discussed by the majority of the Lithuanian Reform 
Movement which later won the first multi-party elections in Lithuanian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, the outcome of these discussions was different than in Latvia and 
Estonia:  
Unlike Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania’s laws on citizenship and minority rights were consistent 
with the expectations of the international community right from the start. The Citizenship Law (1991) 
offered citizenship to all permanent residents of the country and the Constitution and other laws have 
supported minority rights. The result of this legislation was that, according to the 2001 census, 99 % of 
all residents had Lithuanian citizenship (Statistical Office of Estonia, Central Statistical Bureau of 
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Latvia, and Statistics of Lithuania 2003). The Constitution of Lithuania adopted in 1992 guarantees 
cultural minority rights and prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity. It allows Lithuania’s ethnic 
minorities to foster their language, culture, and customs, and grants minorities the right to administer 
their affairs, independent of the State, in the areas of culture, education and organisations (Budrytė, 
2011, p. 24).  
The decisions made by Lithuanian authorities were praised by international 
community; however, the as in Estonia and Latvia, the debates about the status of the 
minorities were greatly influenced by geopolitical and nationalist considerations. The 
ethnic insecurity in Lithuania was expressed through the desire to preserve 
Lithuanian language and doubts concerning loyalty of its non-Lithuanian citizens 
(Budrytė, 2011, p. 24).  
To conclude, the citizenship politics and principles of exclusion or inclusion 
play a significant role in the nation-building. In the Baltic States both citizenship 
politics and processes of the nation-building were greatly influenced by Soviet legacy 
and national historiography. The geopolitical insecurities regarding newly re-built 
nation states and questioned loyalty of national minorities as well as perceived threats 
from Russia effected how the politics of citizenship were constructed and he political 
community was created. While it seems that in Lithuania’s case the issues of 
citizenship of the national minorities were solved quite successfully compared to 
Latvia and Estonia, once the laws of citizenship became restrictive in Lithuania, it 
stayed that way. 
 
7. Research design: a case study 
 
The aim of the thesis is to explain the resistance to dual citizenship in 
Lithuania. Therefore, the main question to be answered is: why there is resistance to 
dual citizenship and how to explain it? In order to explain the opposition to dual 
citizenship in Lithuania, the case study has been chosen as a research strategy.  
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The case study is used as a research strategy in various situations, to expand 
theoretical and practical knowledge of the social, individual, political, organizational, 
and related phenomena. The case study is used to analyze policy, political science, 
public administration, sociology, management studies and mostly in a dissertations 
and theses in the social sciences (Yin, 1984, p. 13). The need for cases study derives 
from the researchers’ aspirations to analyze and understand complex social 
phenomena. In some situations the case study as the research design has a distinct 
advantage. According to Robert K. Yin, in situations when a research question begins 
with the words “why” or “how” and when a contemporary set of events over which 
the researcher has little or no control are analyzed, the case study has the advantage 
(Yin, 2009, p. 4). The logic of the case study as the research design is composed of 
two elements: a scope of the case study and the technical definition of the case study. 
To quote Yin: 
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
 Investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when 
 The boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
2. The case study inquiry  
 Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
 Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
 Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis (Yin, 2009 , p. 18). 
The political phenomenon analyzed in this thesis is the resistance and opposition to 
dual citizenship in Lithuania. The case study as the research design is a relevant 
method to analyze the politics of dual citizenship because the problem of the thesis is 
compatible with the logic of the case study. Firstly, the politics of dual citizenship in 
Lithuania is a very significant topic right now as it was mentioned before. The whole 
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debate is situated in its real-life context; however, the boundaries are not clear 
between the context of the citizenship politics and the actual politics of the dual 
citizenship. The main question of the thesis is about a complex social phenomenon 
and requires different sources of data. What is more, the previous theoretical 
knowledge is applied in order to explain the resistance to dual citizenship in 
Lithuania – the theoretical framework of the nation-state building and geopolitical 
thinking in the post-soviet states. Therefore, to conclude what this case study is 
about: the case study investigates 1) the contemporary phenomenon – the resistance 
to the dual citizenship in Lithuania – and 2) which is situated in its real life context – 
large emigration extent, emigrants’ demands and ongoing debates in the media. In 
order to explain the resistance to dual citizenship in Lithuania, certain theoretical 
assumptions had to be made first.  
The role of theory in the case studies is to make sure that the research design is 
constructed according to some relation to the academic literature, policy issues and 
other relevant sources. Good usage of theories helps to delimit the case study 
questions to its most effective research design and generalize the results of inquiry 
more accurately (Yin, 2003, p. 5-6). The theory of the nation-state building combined 
with the theory of the geopolitical thinking in the post-soviet states helped form and 
decide on the initial hypothesis of this case study.  
The analysis of this case study is as follows: the explanation of the resistance 
and opposition to dual citizenship in Lithuania starts with the analysis of the 
regulation of the citizenship in the Constitution of Lithuania adopted in 1992. This is 
followed by the analysis of the political resistance to dual citizenship in Lithuania 
nowadays despite the changed political context and pressure from Lithuanian 
emigrants to allow dual citizenship. 
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7.1. Methodology: expert interviewing 
 
The main methodology of data collection used in this case study was expert 
interviewing. All the interviews were conducted by me. 
Interviewing is considered to be one of the most important sources of case study 
data in the social sciences. The type of the interviewing used in this research was of 
an open-ended nature and semi-structured. These types of interviews allow the 
researcher to ask key respondents for certain facts of the phenomenon analyzed as 
well as the respondents’ opinions about certain events which may become the basis of 
the further investigation (Yin, 1984, p. 83). The semi-structured interviews were 
conducted because certain questions had to be asked differently to certain 
respondents and their opinion on the issues analyzed had the primary importance for 
this thesis. 
The strength of the interviewing as methodology is that it allows both interviewer 
and respondents to explore the meaning of the questions and answers involved in the 
research. There is an implicit or explicit negotiation of understanding in the interview 
and any misunderstandings on the both sides can be checked immediately. What is 
more, the interviewing has an advantage of rapid and immediate responses which 
may not be obtained in any other research methodology (Brenner et al., 1985, p. 3).  
The disadvantages of interviewing include costly means and time consumption 
while transcribing them, and the opportunity for bias to occur because of the close 
intensive, face-to-face conversation between the researcher and the respondent. Some 
respondents may feel sensitive about the questions asked; some may be incompetent 
to answer certain questions and this may result in invalid answers (Brenner et al., 
1985, p. 4).  
The interviewing is also considered to be a certain challenge for the researcher 
because it requires certain characteristics and skills. Yin defines the required skills 
needed for data collection as follows: 
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 A person should be able to ask good questions – and to interpret the answers. 
 A person should be a good “listener” and not be trapped by his or her own ideologies 
and preconceptions. 
 A person should be adaptive and flexible, so that newly encountered situations can be 
seen as opportunities, not threats. 
 A person must have a firm grasp of the issues being studied, whether this is a theoretical 
or policy orientation, even if in an exploratory mode. 
 A person should be unbiased by preconceived notions, including those derived from 
theory. Thus, a person should be sensitive and responsive to contradictory evidence 
(Yin, 1984, p. 56-57). 
Therefore, while interview is being conducted, the researcher has to have all the 
above mentioned traits in mind and remain careful. At the same time the interviewer 
has to monitor whether her or his actions are relevant and adequate in the context of 
interview situation and interview guide. What is more, the answers provided by 
respondents need to be monitored as well: are the answers to the questions adequate, 
complete and relevant? Therefore, the researcher must be able to react to any 
inconsistencies and at the same time think what to do next (Brenner, 1985, p. 154).  
Despite the difficulties of the interviewing, this methodology may be one of the 
most revealing for the researcher and an interesting and important academic 
experience. 
7.2. The respondents and conducting the interviews 
The respondents of the interviews were carefully selected to make sure they are 
working with the issues of the Lithuanian citizenship and are competitive to answer 
the questions and comment on the whole situation. Initially, two respondents were 
selected and contacted from each of the institution that is dealing with issues of the 
citizenship and dual citizenship in Lithuania. These institutions are: The 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, The Foreign Affairs Ministry of 
the Republic of Lithuania, The Presidential Palace and the Migration Department of 
the Republic of Lithuania. Two respondents who were not state officials were 
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selected as well in order to get a more comprehensive understanding and probably a 
different perspective about the politics of dual citizenship in Lithuania: a journalist 
and editor who has published articles about dual citizenship in Lithuania, and a 
political scientist from the International Relations and Political Science Institute of 
Vilnius University.  
Unfortunately, the both interviews with the officials from the Migration 
Department were not recorded because of the error of the recorder. The notes were 
being taken during these interviews; however, I think that the notes are not suitable 
for the analysis because they are not reliable source of data and may not be accurate 
enough compared to the transcribed interviews of the other respondents.  
A set of questions was prepared for the interviews based on the initial theoretical 
explanations for the certain citizenship politics in the post-soviet states. At the time 
when the interviews were scheduled, I only had some theoretical assumptions about 
the politics of the dual citizenship in Lithuania. However, the questions reflect the 
main themes and my initial hypothesis that I intended to cover when conducting these 
expert interviews. First of all, I was interested in the circumstances which surrounded 
the adoption of the Constitution of Lithuania in 1992. Second of all, the objective was 
to find out why there is no change in the politics of dual citizenship nowadays. The 
questions may be found in the appendix 1.  
Even though I had the questions prepared in order to help me cover the most 
important issues, I had to be flexible in asking those questions when I was 
interviewing different respondents. Some of the questions were asked all the 
respondents, while others were not. As one of my objectives was to find out how the 
concept of citizenship is understood by the officials, they all of them were asked this 
question. However, the certain questions seemed to be more complicated to answer 
for some respondents and I soon noticed that I need to ask the same question but in a 
different way in order to get the answer. The flexibility of the questions was required 
and they were not asked in the same order in every interview.  
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What is more, almost all respondents mentioned that the topic of my thesis is a 
sensitive one and asked anonymity. For some respondents I had to assure several 
times that their names and exact occupations will not appear in the text. The 
anonymity was required by the state officials in the Foreign Affairs ministry, the 
Presidential Palace and the Migration department. The Justices of the Constitutional 
Court did not ask for anonymity, nor did the political scientist and journalist.  
As the researcher I was already familiar with the Law on Citizenship and the 
Constitution of Lithuania as well as the debate about the dual citizenship in Lithuania, 
therefore, I was mostly interested in my respondents’ personal opinions and 
interpretations of certain events, political decisions and laws mentioned above. When 
I expressed my wish to hear the personal opinions about the politics of dual 
citizenship in Lithuania, I soon realized that certain respondents, state officials in 
particular, felt uneasy because of the difference between what they really think as 
individuals and what they should think as being officials and implementers of the law. 
Some of the respondents repeated several times that their opinion is personal and 
does not reflect the laws. It was mentioned that they are not talking as the state 
officials to me but expressing their own opinions about the matter. Some respondents 
told directly that they are supposed to answer the questions asked as state officials 
governed by law only and that their opinion should coincide with what is written in 
laws. An interesting observation was made when the interviews were conducted with 
the Justices of the Constitutional Court. Their opinions were heavily affected by their 
legal practice and expertise in law and the way they explain the whole situation was 
quite different. 
Some interviews were longer than others and it depended largely on the time the 
respondents could spend talking to me. Because of the time shortage I had to decide 
what questions are more important to ask while the interviews were already being 
taken and to adjust the questions according to the respondents’ occupation. I met all 
the respondents at their work place, except the political scientist and the journalist. 
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When conducting interviews, if the researcher is conducting them himself or 
herself, one of the essential things is to decide how to present oneself. This desicion 
is very important because the way the researcher presents oneself leaves an 
impression on the respondents and even has influence over the answers to the 
questions and overall success of the study (Fontana and Frey, 2003, p. 77). I started to 
think about how to present myself to the respondents from the very beginning. 
Because the sensitive issue in contemporary Lithuanian politics is being analyzed, it 
was important for me as the investigator to not pose any threat for the respondents 
and their jobs. All the respondents were relieved to know that I am not a journalist 
but a student at the university abroad. In the beginning of the each interview I told my 
respondents a little about myself and about the purpose of these interviews in order to 
assure them that my objectives are purely academic and the content of the interviews 
will not reach any media. Trusting the investigator is also essential for the 
respondents (Fontana and Frey, 2003, p. 78). Therefore, my presentation of myself 
had to make the respondents trust me because as it was mentioned above, the 
questions that are being asked are related to sensitive political issue in contemporary 
Lithuania.  
Despite the challenges of the interviewing the respondents discussed in this 
chapter, somehow consistent answers to the questions have appeared in almost all 
interviews. The respondents answered similarly to the key questions that were aimed 
at understanding the resistance to the dual citizenship in Lithuania. The question of 
reliability is unavoidable, however, I believe that I have chosen the respondents 
carefully and their answers are reliable and enable me to draw certain conclusions 
about the issue analyzed in the thesis.  
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8. The politics of citizenship in Lithuania 
 
The resistance and opposition to dual citizenship in Lithuania are analyzed in 
the following parts of the thesis. In order to analyze the politics of the dual citizenship 
in Lithuania, they need to be situated in the broader context of the citizenship politics. 
The politics of the citizenship in Lithuania are presented in the following chapter and 
analyzed using the theoretical framework of the nation-state building and geopolitical 
thinking in the post-soviet states. The law on Citizenship and the Constitution of 
Lithuania are analyzed in order to show how restricted is dual citizenship and reasons 
for this restriction are discussed.  
The politics of citizenship in Lithuania was quite uncontroversial compared to 
Latvia and Estonia and therefore, scholars usually concentrate on Latvia and Estonia 
when analyzing the politics of the citizenship in the Baltic States. Even though, the 
analysis are of the Baltic States politics on citizenship, Lithuania are usually excluded 
from the deeper analysis because of there were no major conflicts regarding 
citizenship with Lithuania’s ethnic minorities unlike in Latvia and Estonia.  
Lithuania became the first Soviet republic to adopt republic level citizenship 
law on November 3, 1989, just some months before declaring Independence on 
March 11, 1990. The citizenship law in Lithuania was an inclusive compromise 
between the restored-state model and new-state model: citizens of the interwar 
Lithuania and their descendants were granted with Lithuanian citizenship 
automatically, as well persons born and permanently residing in Lithuania and are not 
citizens of the another states. Others residing in Lithuania on the date when this 
citizenship law was enacted were given two years to decide whether they want to 
become citizens of Lithuania. There were no conditions of language, ethnicity or 
permanent residence for acquisition of the automatic citizenship. Out of population of 
around 3.5 million, only about 350 000 residents did not receive Lithuanian 
citizenship before the two-year period has ended and it was mostly because of the 
lack of information or choice rather than legal exclusion. Some residents feared the 
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reverse of the Independence and threats to those who gave up the Soviet citizenship 
(Barrington, 1995, p. 734).  
Why the initial politics of citizenship in Lithuania after re-gaining 
Independence were so different than in Latvia and Estonia? There may be several 
explanations. First and the most important factor is that the political authorities have 
felt secure about Lithuania’s ethnodemography. Ethnic Lithuanians shared 80% of 
the residents through interwar period till 1989. Unlike in the cases of Latvia and 
Estonia there was no massive Russian immigration. According to the Statistics 
Lithuania, proportion of ethnic Lithuanians is 83,7% in 2012 compared to the total 
population, ethnic Russians – 5,3%, ethnic Poles – 6,6%, Belarussians – 1,3%, 
Ukrainians – 0,6% (Lithuanian Official Statistics Portal). If we look at the statistics, it 
is clear that the percentage of Russian minority in Lithuania is significantly smaller 
than in Latvia and Estonia. However, as it is presented in the following parts of the 
thesis, Lithuanian political elites were and still are concerned about them. 
 
8.1. The law on Citizenship, the Constitution and the nation-state building in 
post-soviet Lithuania 
 
The development of Lithuanian citizenship legislation can be divided into three 
phases. The first phase started with the adoption of 1989 law on Citizenship which 
provided inclusive conditions for acquiring Lithuanian Citizenship (Kruma, 2009, p. 
98). The second phase was when the law on Citizenship of 1989 was replaced by the 
new one on December 5 in 1991. The new law on Citizenship was different from the 
one adopted in 1989 as it eliminated granting automatic citizenship for permanent 
residents while those who were citizens of Lithuania before 1940 were able to acquire 
Lithuanian citizenship without naturalization. What is more, the resolution was 
passed which stated that acquisition of Lithuanian citizenship made the Soviet 
citizenship invalid for that person (Barrington, 1995, p. 734). The stricter conditions 
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for acquiring Lithuanian citizenship were introduced. This second phase was 
confusing and problematic because the political authorities were trying to combine 
the principle of continuity of Lithuanian citizenship and avoidance of the dual 
citizenship. The third phase marks the introduction of 2002 law on Citizenship which 
attempted to make provisions to the 1991 law on Citizenship and liberalize the 
regulation of dual citizenship (Kruma, 2009, p. 98).  
The 1991 law on Citizenship began the phase of strict regulation of Lithuanian 
citizenship. The criteria for naturalization were expended as well. The regulation of 
dual citizenship in Lithuania was attempted to liberalize with every new provision of 
law on Citizenship since 1991. None of these attempts were successful because all the 
initiated provisions to allow dual citizenship to more Lithuanian citizens ended up 
vetoed by all Lithuanian presidents who were elected at the time.  
The principles of Lithuanian citizenship and some articles regulating 
Citizenship in the Constitution of Lithuania are presented in the analysis because it 
shows how strict is the regulation and the fact that Lithuanian citizen cannot be 
citizen of another state is mentioned both in law on Citizenship and the Constitution. 
Principles of the current Lithuanian citizenship presented in 2010 Law on Citizenship 
include: 
1. Citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania shall be based on the continuity of 
the Republic of Lithuania and its citizenship; 
2. Every Lithuanian shall have the right to citizenship of the Republic of 
Lithuania, which shall be implemented in accordance with the procedure laid 
down by this Law; 
3. Citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania shall be equal irrespective of the 
ground on which it has been acquired; 
4. A citizen of the Republic of Lithuania may not be a citizen of another state at 
the same time, except in individual cases provided for in law on Citizenship; 
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5. A citizen of the Republic of Lithuania residing in another state shall not lose 
citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania; 
6. A citizen of the Republic of Lithuania may not be deprived of citizenship.  
7. Citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania shall be lost only on the grounds and 
in accordance with the procedure laid down by this Law (Law on Citizenship, 
Article 3). 
The first principle emphasizes that the Lithuanian citizenship is based on 
continuity of the Lithuanian state and its citizenship. The emphasis on the 
continuation is the result of the restorationist politics in Lithuania after the re-gaining 
Independence. The political elites were restoring interwar republic of Lithuania with 
all its citizenry and the citizenship policies after 1991 strongly reflected this notion. 
The principles that Lithuanian citizenship may not be deprived and lost because of 
the residence in another state show that the Lithuanian citizenship is perceived as 
very important and should be protected by the state. The principles stated above form 
a certain notion that the Lithuanian citizenship is something to be secured, preserved 
and continued.  
The text of the Constitution is also worth analyzing because it states the 
principles of the state of Lithuania and is helpful in putting Lithuania in the 
theoretical framework of the nation-building in the post-soviet states. The 
Constitution of Lithuania begins with preamble which defines the Lithuanian nation: 
 THE LITHUANIAN NATION 
– having created the State of Lithuania many centuries ago, 
– having based its legal foundations on the Lithuanian Statutes and the Constitutions of the 
Republic of Lithuania, 
– having for centuries staunchly defended its freedom and independence, 
– having preserved its spirit, native language, writing, and customs, 
– embodying the innate right of the human being and the Nation to live and create freely in the 
land of their fathers and forefathers—in the independent State of Lithuania, 
– fostering national concord in the land of Lithuania, 
– striving for an open, just, and harmonious civil society and State under the rule of law,  
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by the will of the citizens of the reborn State of Lithuania, adopts and proclaims this 
CONSTITUTION (Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania).  
It is clear from this preamble that the nation-building in the post-soviet Lithuania 
was based on the Lithuania’s historiography and national memory. The usage of 
words describing what is the Lithuanian nation is essential here. The Constitution of 
Lithuania clearly states what the Lithuanian nation is:  the state of Lithuania was 
created centuries ago by its fathers and forefathers and defended its freedom and 
independence and is reborn after years of occupation. Another thing emphasized is 
the Lithuanian language, culture and spirit and harmony. This preamble emphasizes 
and highlights the historical memory, existence and continuation of the Lithuanian 
state.   
The continuation of the Lithuanian state is of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
(1253-1795). This period is considered to be “the Golden Age” of the Lithuanian 
state. Although, there are disputes still going on whether ”the Golden Age” has ended 
when the constitutional Union was formed with Poland and resulted in the creation of 
the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth in 1569 (Snyder, 2003, p. 17). The preamble of 
the Constitution is referring to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania when it states that the 
Lithuanian state was created many centuries ago. The continuation of the Lithuanian 
state was also emphasized and based on the history of the Grand Duchy when the 
independence of Lithuania was announced for the first time in 1918.  
The citizenship politics after 1991 reflected this particular historiography and 
restoration of the state of Lithuania. The post-soviet Lithuania was turning back to its 
collective memory and history of the interwar republic of Lithuania and the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania in order to consolidate and secure the re-born state. The soviet-
legacy that newly independent Lithuania had to deal with was not so much the 
Russian minority (because it was significantly smaller than in Latvia and Estonia) but 
rather the historical trauma of the Soviet occupation. The ruling political elites in the 
independent Lithuania were repeating all the time that the occupation was illegitimate 
and illegal. What is more, the Russian Federation was perceived as a successor state 
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of the Soviet Union and consequently a threat to independent Lithuania as well. 
Therefore, the politics in Lithuania shortly after re-gaining Independence were 
organized around several main ideas. These ideas were expressed by the ruling 
political elite and are consistently summarized in this paragraph quoted below: 
First, they argued that Lithuania’s interwar state was lost to Soviet influence, which they 
associated with Russia, and that after the Cold War Lithuania’s newly regained statehood was 
threatened most by Russia. A strong state was therefore to be an important defense of the sovereignty 
of the Lithuanian nation. Second, Lithuania’s nationalists argued that economic dependence on Russia 
was the state’s primary security threat. Third, they argued that the state should therefore “reorient” its 
politics and economy from East to West. That is, Lithuania should cultivate close economic 
relationships with “European” states and reduce its economic dependence on Russia. And while the 
Lithuanian government should become part of the EU, NATO, and other Western institutions, it 
should reject under all circumstances multilateral, institutionalized economic and political relationships 
with post-Soviet states as a group, especially the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
(Abdelal, 2002, p. 464).  
These arguments have a strong geopolitical notion. Lithuanian political elites 
feared political and economic influence from Russia and therefore a strong state had 
to be built in order to escape this influence and secure the sovereignty. The 
citizenship politics were believed to be essential in the processes of the nation-
building and securing the sovereignty of Lithuania. The political elites in the post-
soviet Lithuania had to make sure that they the citizens of Lithuania are loyal, can be 
trusted and were committed to the Constitution of Lithuania and laws. This statement 
in law on Citizenship sums up what is expected from citizens of Lithuania: 
A citizen of the Republic of Lithuania must observe the Constitution, laws and other legal acts of 
the Republic of Lithuania, as well as international treaties to which the Republic of Lithuania is a 
party, fulfil the responsibilities set forth therein, protect the interests of the Republic of Lithuania, help 
strengthen its power and authority, and be loyal to it (Law on Citizenship, Article 6).  
The loyalty of the Russian minority was always questioned in the Lithuanian politics. 
Despite the fact that the number of citizens are of Russian ethnicity is comparatively small, 
they are perceived to pose a threat to the state of Lithuania because they are Russian and 
according to the perception that Russia is the biggest security threat to Lithuania, they 
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become threatening as well. Especially when the Russian interest in the post-soviet states is 
legitimized in Russian geopolitics because of these ethnic Russian minorities as it was 
discussed in the previous parts of the thesis.  
To sum up this chapter, it is possible to argue that the post-soviet Lithuania fits 
into the theoretical framework of the nation-building and geopolitical thinking of the 
post-soviet states. The nation-state was re-build by turning back to “the Golden Age” 
of Lithuania, the history of interwar statehood and Lithuanian culture and language. 
Moreover, the political elites in independent Lithuania immediately turned away from 
any association to the Soviet Union and established Russia as the biggest security 
threat. The citizenship politics after 1991 and the Constitution of Lithuania reflect 
these notions of the nation-building in post-soviet Lithuania. The restriction of dual 
citizenship is also one of the expressions of such perceptions and is analyzed in the 
next chapters.  
 
9. The politics of dual citizenship in Lithuania 
 
The politics of the dual citizenship in Lithuania are currently and persistently 
debated issue in the media, forums, public sphere. However, the arguments for and 
against the dual citizenship in Lithuania are not analyzed consistently and throughout, 
and there are many speculations regarding the political desicions made to regulate the 
aqcuisition of the dual citizenship. This section of the thesis aims at explaining the 
resistance to dual citizenship in Lithuanian politics using the information collected 
during expert interviews and relating them to the theoretical framework of the nation-
building and citizenship politics in the post-soviet nation states.  
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9.1. The context  
 
The regulation of the dual citizenship began as early as 1991 law on Citizenship  
and the Constitution of  Lithuania adopted in 1992. Both of these legal documents 
state that the citizen of Lithuania may not be citizen of another state at the same time. 
The article 12 in the Constitution states: 
Citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania shall be acquired by birth and other grounds established 
by law. 
With the exception of individual cases provided for by law, no one may be a citizen of both the 
Republic of Lithuania and another state at the same time. 
The procedure for the acquisition and loss of citizenship shall be established by law (The 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania). 
It is interesting to note that while the acquisition of the Lithuanian citizenship is 
not specified that much in the Constitution, there is this sentence about the restriction 
of dual citizenship. It can be argued that this restriction, which is stated in the 
supreme law in Lithuania, tells us something about how dual citizenship was 
understood by the political authorities in 1992 and what kind of implications for 
Lithuania it was perceived it had.  
The most common cases when Lithuanian citizen may be the citizen of another 
state include: 
 he has acquired citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania and citizenship 
of another state at birth and he has not reached 21 years of age; 
 he is a person who was exiled from the occupied Republic of Lithuania 
before 11 March 1990 and acquired citizenship of another state; 
 he is a person who fled the Republic of Lithuania before 11 March 1990 
and acquired citizenship of another state; 
 he is a descendant of a person who was exiled or fled from the occupied 
Republic of Lithuania before 11 March 1990;  
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 he has acquired citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania by way of 
exception while being a citizen of another state; 
 by virtue of marriage to a citizen of another state he has ipso 
facto acquired citizenship of that state (Law on Citizenship, Article 7). 
It is clear that the allowance of dual citizenship in Lithuania is also related to the 
continuation and restoration of the Lithuanian citizenship if it was lost during the 
Soviet Occupation. In most of the cases when the dual citizenship was acquired 
according to the criteria mentioned above, those people were of Lithuanian ethnicity 
and descent.  
This list does not include the right to dual citizenship for the Lithuanian citizens 
who left Lithuania after the 11 March 1990 and this is the reason why the whole 
debate has started after the emigration from Lithuania intensified from 2004. The 
Lithuanian emigrants have raised the demand to be allowed to have dual citizenship 
because they are ethnically Lithuanian and therefore, they should not be deprived 
from the Lithuanian citizenship if they acquire another state’s citizenship. The issue 
of the dual citizenship is persistently raised by the Lithuanian World Community as 
well as other Lithuanian communities residing in Europe, mostly in the member 
states of the EU. The arguments for the liberalization of the dual citizenship from the 
emigrants’ perspective include:  the economic gain for the state of Lithuania because 
of the remittances that emigrants send to their families residing in Lithuania, the 
chance to enrich Lithuania’s cultural life, and the knowledge and expertise that 
emigrants gain and by doing so they may contribute to Lithuania. In other words, dual 
citizenship for Lithuanian emigrants would be beneficial for Lithuania. What is more, 
it is argued that for such small state like Lithuania, it should be essential to ensure 
that the number of citizens is not decreasing. Lithuanian emigrants encourage 
politicians in Lithuania to change the regulation of dual citizenship by introducing 
certain provisions in the law on Citizenship and the Constitution (Narušienė, 2012).  
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The Constitutional Court of Lithuania in 2006 has ruled that according to the 
Constitution of Lithuania the cases when the Lithuanian citizen is citizen of another 
state should be extremely rare and therefore, it cannot become a norm. The only way 
to change the regulation of the dual citizenship in Lithuania is to change the article in 
the Constitution which forbids (except the cases mentioned above) it. It has been 
argued that there is no other way to change this regulation because if there are no 
changes in the Constitution regarding this question, all other provisions of law on 
Citizenship will be conflicting with the Constitution. The only way to change the 
Constitution is by referendum (The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, 
Case No. 45/03-36/04, 2006).  
Having stated that the main restriction of dual citizenship in Lithuania is 
established in the supreme law – the Constitution, I now turn to the following 
questions. First of all, why there is this restriction of the dual citizenship in the 
Constitution? In other words, what circumstances might have influenced this 
particular regulation of the dual citizenship in the Constitution in 1992? Second of all, 
why the needed changes of the regulation of the dual citizenship in the Constitution 
are not initiated now?  
 
9.2. Analysis of the experts interviews: explaining the resistance to dual 
citizenship in Lithuania 
 
The main topics that I tried to cover while conducting interviews include the 
understanding of what citizenship is and how is it different from dual citizenship, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the dual citizenship for the state, and the 
circumstances or events that effected the regulation if citizenship and dual citizenship 
in Lithuania in years 1991 – 1992 and why there are no changes regarding regulation 
of dual citizenship now.  
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9.2.1. The understanding of citizenship and dual citizenship 
 
All the respondents were asked the question: How do you understand what 
citizenship is? The answers to this question varied slightly because different aspects 
of citizenship were emphasized, however it was mentioned by all respondents that 
citizenship is the relation between an individual and the state: 
“Relation between a human and a state which creates an amount of rights and duties.” 
(Respondent 1) 
“It is the relation between a man and a state, relation between citizen and state and this relation 
creates, in this relation emerges person‘s rights and duties to the state and other citizens as well as 
state‘s duties to the person, the citizen. This is mutual relation.“ (Respondent 2) 
“I understand citizenship through commitment to the state whose citizen you are.“ (Respondent 
3) 
“For me it is the relation with the state, mutual obligation.” (Respondent 5) 
“The shortest way to explain this – membership.” (Respondent 6) 
“It is a social relation which determines relation among people living in the same territory, the 
state. The citizenship is the social institution which makes social relation into legal one. A formal 
institution which includes social relations.” (Respondent 7) 
“The citizenship is a political relation between the person and the state.” (Respondent 8) 
The answers to the question how respondents understand what dual citizenship is 
include: 
„Duties and your duties to two states. There is not much discussion about this. How to explain. It 
is very funny to me to be honest. This is not comparable at all. Duties to two states. One citizenship is 
one citizenship, dual is dual.” (Respondent 1) 
„serving to two states” (Respondent 3) 
“It is the obligation to two states.” (Respondent 5) 
“Dual citizenship is the problematic thing”. (Respondent 7) 
“Dual citizenship means dual political dependence. Dual loyalty.” (Respondent 8) 
When asked whether they see a contradiction when the person is a dual citizen, 
all the respondents answer positively. According to these answers it may be argued 
that the concept of dual citizenship is somehow not established itself yet in the 
political thinking of Lithuanian politicians. There is the opposition to the dual 
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citizenship. It is not being thought as the right thing. After I heard all the answers to 
these questions, I have realized that an interesting hypothesis may be raised: the 
resistance and opposition to dual citizenship in Lithuania exist because the concept of 
the dual citizenship is perceived as contradictory and unacceptable. It is reasonable to 
think that there would be no changes in the regulation of the dual citizenship as long 
as the concept of the dual citizenship is seen as somehow contradictory to what 
citizenship is believed to represent. Almost all respondents expressed concerns about 
the dual loyalty and questioned whether it is even possible to be loyal for two states. 
9.2.2. The circumstances that influenced the creation of the Constitution and the 
law on Citizenship 
 
I argue that the circumstances which influenced the regulation of dual citizenship 
are important to analyze because they may lead to a better understanding of the 
nation-building processes in post-soviet Lithuania and explanation of the restriction 
of dual citizenship.  
The answers to this question provided an insight of the reasons for such strict 
regulation for dual citizenship in the Constitution in 1992. These reasons were related 
to the issues of the geopolitical insecurity in post-soviet Lithuania and perceived 
threats at that time. These threats included ethnic minorities residing in the territory 
of Lithuania shortly after independence and their questioned loyalty, as well as the 
fact that Russia was perceived to be the biggest threat at that time. The biggest fear 
was that the independence is still uncertain or that independent Lithuania will soon 
fall under the influence of Russia.  
Some of the answers to the question “what circumstances might have influenced 
the regulation of Lithuanian citizenship and dual citizenship in years 1991-1992?” are 
as follows: 
“Well there was... when the laws were being written… […] I think there was always fear. Fear of 
threats. From that neighbor of ours nearby, and that law was written in that way that persons from ex 
- Soviet army in Lithuania would not be able to get citizenship that easily.” (Respondent 1). 
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“I believe it was very difficult times and there was a lot of fear around 1992. The Red Army was 
still in Lithuania’s territory at that time.” (Respondent 2) 
“We lived in the political situation that we had and what we have now. Political situation then 
and even now is not entirely secure. Of course I am not a paranoid person but I think that certain 
security measures are necessary.” (Respondent 3) 
“Our citizenship law is the result of our historical and political past. Having this in mind, I have 
to say, that we simply cannot have more inclusive and liberal law. I hardly imagine that. Especially, 
when you have in mind the circumstances in which we gained our Independence in 1990.” 
(Respondent 3) 
“There was a wish to distance and disassociate from any kind of external impacts. For example, 
we were afraid that Russians will come, will have citizenships, will effects our politics, will have 
impact on everything. Therefore, what was written in 1992 was a certain self-defence action.“ 
(Respondent 4) 
“The circumstances. Right, the army of another state still was in Lithuania. The state was just 
created and it tried to defend itself by all means possible.” (Respondent 5) 
“The Constitution is full of fears. There is even a paragraph in the Constitution saying that 
Lithuania will not join certain organizations, meaning Commonwealth of Independent States, this was 
done obviously because of fear, and I think you will not find anything like this in any other 
Constitution of any other Eastern European state. This fear, I think, was ill-founded and lifted to the 
Constitutional level. This was unique, actually. If you see this fear, you can relate it to restrictions of 
dual citizenship in Lithuania. For me it is very funny when the norm starts with a word „no one“. You 
can understand easily how much fear and negativity is there.“ (Respondent 6)  
So many answers are presented here in order to show that the geopolitical fear of 
Russia and the need to trust the citizens in the early years of the nation-building 
processes had a significant impact on the regulation of the dual citizenship in the 
post-soviet Lithuania. Both nation-building in the post-soviet Lithuania and the 
citizenship politics were greatly influenced by the geopolitical insecurities and the 
Soviet legacy – The Russian minority residing in the Lithuania.   
9.2.3. The resistance to change the regulation of dual citizenship nowadays 
 
The strict regulation of the dual citizenship in the post-soviet Lithuania in 1991-
1992 is explained by the geopolitical insecurity that influenced nation-building and 
52 
 
citizenship politics, but what about the resistance to the dual citizenship these days? 
The context is quite different now, the independence of Lithuania is secured and 
Lithuania is a member of the EU and NATO. What is more, dual citizenship became 
much more relevant because of large extent of emigration and emigrant’s expressed 
demands for changes in the regulation of the dual citizenship. Therefore, it is 
important to ask: why there are no changes in the regulation of the dual citizenship 
despite the changed circumstances and the secured statehood of Lithuania? 
The answers from the respondents to this question revealed several reasons. One 
of them is still being the perceived insecurity and threats related to Russia and 
Russian minority in Lithuania. It is feared that if the dual citizenship is liberalized the 
Russian minority would also acquire Russian citizenship and consequently, Russia 
would interfere with Lithuania’s political life or even organize a military intervention 
like it happened in 2008 with Georgia.   
“So, if today you would read official foreign affairs doctrine of Russia, you would see that the 
security and physical defense of ethnic Russians in foreign territories is one of the most important 
objectives. They do not care if you are also a citizen of other state; they are committed to defend 
Russian citizens at all costs. Therefore I think that in the environment we live in it would be a threat to 
national security to allow dual citizenship in this case.” (Respondent 3) 
“I would think about the fact that, I don‘t know, 5000 or 10 000 Russians now live in Lithuania. 
Maybe less, I don‘t remember. Suddenly, there is 50 000 Russian citizens in Lithuania and what 
happens? Our neighbor says that we are violating the rights of Russian citizens and they send 
something here. A couple of trucks with troops. Of course I am being a little bit sarcastic now but 
there is truth in this.(Respondent 5) 
 “The citizenship may be politized matter in foreign affairs and everything depends on good 
relations between neighbor states. If the relations are not good, threats are bigger. The example that 
everybody gives now is conflict between Georgia and Russia that happened in 2008. If the state wants 
to defend its citizens in another state and if relations are historically complicated, there is a source for 
conflict.” (Respondent 6) 
“In some states dual citizenship does not pose any serious risks. In case of Lithuania, there are 
some risks. Lithuania is in inconvenient geopolitical situation. We are independent for more than 
twenty years but if we look at last, I don’t know, two hundred years, we were not so independent. The 
essential thing is such a thing as Russia. Dual citizenship in case of Lithuania may open the way to 
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some threats. Dual loyalty for Poland or Russia wouldn’t be the best thing for Lithuania.” 
(Respondent 7) 
It may be argued that the reasons for strict regulation mentioned above are stated 
clearly by the respondents, another possible reason for the resistance to dual 
citizenship was a bit harder to grasp from the context. Almost all of the respondents 
argued that the current situation of the dual citizenship in Lithuania is not a problem 
at all. While all of the respondents were familiar with the demands by emigrants, only 
two of them agreed that the regulation of the dual citizenship should be liberalized. 
Other respondents did not agree that the emigration from Lithuania is a problem and 
that liberalization of the dual citizenship is one of the ways to sustain the nation. The 
dominating opinion was that the acquisition of another state’s citizenship is a 
conscious decision made by the individual. It was argued by the majority of the 
respondents that the Lithuanian citizenship is not needed if a person does not live in 
Lithuania, does not participate in its daily life and that proliferation of the dual 
citizenship for Lithuanians would end up in the question of political participation in 
elections if persons are dual citizens and do not live in Lithuania: who and how will 
govern Lithuania?  
At the same time, all of the respondents agreed that the whole situation of the 
debates and speculations regarding the politics of dual citizenship in Lithuania have 
become somehow ridiculous and  changes need to be initiated and decisions need to 
be made. The lack of political will to solve this issue was mentioned several times, as 
well as, the need to make final decisions regarding the regulation of the dual 
citizenship, whether to liberalize it or leave everything as it is and stop all the 
speculations and discussions once and for all. The only way to change the regulation 
of the dual citizenship that was mentioned by all respondents is the changing of the 
Constitution. In Lithuania this can only be done by referendum. For referendum to be 
successful more than a half of all the citizens of Lithuania have to vote. However, 
most of the respondent doubted the success of the referendum because probably not 
enough citizens would come to vote.  
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  “If we decide that we want to change that – referendum is our only choice. We have to tell 
ourselves the one and last time that our Constitution does not fit into the realities of nowadays. The 
world and Lithuania have changed since then. We have to acknowledge that the way we have written 
our Constitution is too strict. So, let’s change it.” (Respondent 5) 
“First of all, technically it is impossible to organize referendum successfully. Secondly, we have 
very low participation of citizens in these kind of things, so, probably the referendum would not be 
even called as happened because not enough people would come to express their opinion. But I see 
referendum as an option for all this circus that is happening.“ (Respondent 4) 
„I will repeat myself – if we decide that our current regulation does not fit the reality we are 
living it, we should try to change it. But it is really difficult to change it. So, if we would have invested 
more time in this, I speak here as a private person, do not mention my name and do not quote me, so if 
we decide that are arguing about this since 2006, seven years have passed, so if we would have 
invested so much energy in solving this questions as we have spent arguing, I believe, the referendum 
would have already happened.” (Respondent 5) 
„The referendum has a chance of not happening because there may be not enough citizens who 
would come to vote. But the referendum is the only way which is mentioned in the Constitution and all 
other ways are deceiving. We should not kid ourselves. We cannot cheat the Constitution. We have to 
play according the rules we created in the Constitution. If people want to change dual citizenship 
regulation, everybody has to sit down and discuss all the pros and cons of this instead of causing 
hysteria which was done in Lithuania.” (Respondent 8) 
“Make the referendum law so that the referendum could actually happen because at this point 
this law practically makes referendum impossible. Especially with the extent of emigration. There 
would not be enough people to vote. Fix the referendum law, have the referendum about dual 
citizenship and that is it.” (Respondent 1) 
To conclude, the resistance to dual citizenship in Lithuania nowadays may be 
also explained through the geopolitical insecurity which is still perceived to exist 
from Russia and Russian minority even more than 20 years later after re-gaining 
Independence. Such long-standing perception that Russia is still a threat to the state 
of Lithuania shows how traumatizing was the Soviet occupation and how this 
perception still effects the political decision-making or lack of it.  
What is more, it is agreed that the speculations and debated about the regulation 
of the dual citizenship in Lithuania has to end and political decisions have to be made 
either to liberalize dual citizenship or leave the current regulation. The dominating 
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view is that the dual citizenship is not necessary for Lithuanian emigrants and 
therefore, the situation of the regulation of dual citizenship is not even a problem. 
However, because of the ongoing debates and speculations about this, all respondents 
mentioned that the political decisions regarding dual citizenship need to be made in 
order to stop this never-ending debate.   
 
10. Conclusions  
 
The objective of this thesis was to explain the opposition and resistance to dual 
citizenship in Lithuania. The problem of the thesis was: despite the large emigration 
extent and emigrant’s demands, debates in the media and public sphere, there are no 
changes made in the regulation of the dual citizenship in Lithuania. While most of the 
European states seem to liberalize and allow dual citizenship for their citizens, the 
regulation of the dual citizenship remains strict in Lithuania since the first regulations 
of citizenship and dual citizenship appeared in 1991-1992.  
The politics of citizenship and resistance to dual citizenship in Lithuania were 
analyzed using the theoretical framework of the nation-building and geopolitical 
thinking in the post-soviet states. It was revealed that the politics of citizenship, 
which included the strict regulation of dual citizenship, was one of the most important 
strategies of the processes of the nation-building and were greatly influenced by the 
geopolitical insecurity and perceived threats from Russia and Russian minority in 
Lithuania. The nation-building in the post-soviet Lithuania was carried out under the 
perceived conditions of the geopolitical threat from Russia. The restriction of the dual 
citizenship in Constitution was supposed to be a mechanism which was created to 
secure the independent statehood of Lithuania. 
Having established that the restriction of the dual citizenship is stated in the 
Constitution of Lithuania and reasons for that analyzed and revealed, it was turned to 
the following question: why there is no political change regarding dual citizenship 
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now when the context has changed and the statehood of Lithuania is secured? The 
interviews revealed several reasons which may be argued to have influenced the non-
making of the political decisions regarding dual citizenship. First of all, according to 
the respondents, concept of dual citizenship is perceived to be contradictory in 
Lithuania, and therefore, dual citizenship is not seen as something necessary for the 
Lithuanian emigrants. Second of all, the resistance to the dual citizenship in Lithuania 
is still related to the perceived geopolitical threat from Russia and questioned loyalty 
of Russian minority in Lithuania. Even though there were no conflicts regarding 
Lithuanian citizenship and this particular minority. The persistence of such 
perceptions reveals how traumatizing the experience of the Soviet occupation was 
and how it is still influences the politics of citizenship in Lithuania.  
Therefore, the initial propositions of this research appear to be correct. The 
resistance to dual citizenship in Lithuania can be explained through the perceived 
geopolitical insecurity and threats related to Russia which is strengthened because of 
the Russian minority residing in Lithuania. 
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12. Appendix 1 
Interview questions 
1) How do you understand citizenship? What does it mean to you? 
2) How do you understand dual citizenship? 
3) Who should have a right to dual citizenship? 
4) What do you think about Lithuania’s citizenship laws? What circumstances 
might have influenced it? 
5) Do you think the issues of citizenship are the field of legal system 
exclusively?  
6) What do you think about emigration extent from Lithuania? 
7) Are you aware of the demands of the Lithuanian emigrants and their 
demands? 
8) What do you think would be advantages and disadvantages if the dual 
citizenship is accepted more widely in Lithuania? 
9) Why do you think there is little change regarding dual citizenship politics in 
Lithuania?  
10) What is your personal opinion about this? Are you for or against?  
 
